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Abstract
The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in the presence of ties and
unacceptable partners, called MAX SMTI, is a well-studied NP-hard problem. The MAX SMTI
is NP-hard even for highly restricted instances where (i) ties appear only in women’s preference
lists and (ii) each tie appears at the end of each woman’s preference list. The current best lower
bounds on the approximation ratio for this variant are 1.1052 unless P=NP and 1.25 under the
unique games conjecture, while the current best upper bound is 1.4616. In this paper, we improve
the upper bound to 1.25, which matches the lower bound under the unique games conjecture.
Note that this is the first special case of the MAX SMTI where the tight approximation bound
is obtained. The improved ratio is achieved via a new analysis technique, which avoids the
complicated case-by-case analysis used in earlier studies. As a by-product of our analysis, we
show that the integrality gap of natural IP and LP formulations for this variant is 1.25. We also
show that the unrestricted MAX SMTI cannot be approximated with less than 1.5 unless the
approximation ratio of a certain special case of the minimum maximal matching problem can be
improved.
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1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem [12, 27] is a classical combinatorial problem introduced by Gale
and Shapley in their celebrated seminal paper [9]. An input of this problem includes two sets;
a set of men and a set of women. Each man submits a preference list that orders women
according to his preference, and similarly each woman submits her preference list. Given
these lists, the problem is to find a stable matching, a matching without any blocking pairs,
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Table 1 Four problem settings of MAX SMTI
Two-sided-ties case (2T) One-sided-ties case (1T)
m1 : w2 w1 w1 : m1 m2
m2 : (w1 w2) w3 w2 : m1 m2
m3 : w3 w3 : (m2 m3)
m1 : w2 w1 w1 : m1
m2 : w2 w3 w2 : (m1 m2) m3
m3 : w3 w2 w3 : m2 m3
Restricted two-sided-ties case (R2T) Restricted one-sided-ties case (R1T)
m1 : w2 w1 w1 : m1 m2
m2 : w1 (w2 w3) w2 : m1 m2
m3 : w3 w3 : (m2 m3)
m1 : w1 w3 w1 : m1 m3
m2 : w2 w3 w2 : m2
m3 : w3 w1 w3 : m2 (m1 m3)
where a blocking pair is that of a man and a woman who might elope (a formal definition is
given in Sec. 2). There are several variants of the problem in terms of the format of preference
lists. In its most general setting, preference lists may contain ties (i.e., two or more men
indifferent to woman w may be included in a tie of w’s list), and may be incomplete (i.e., a
man who is not acceptable to w is missing in her list). It is known that there exists at least
one stable matching in any instance, but there may exist stable matchings of different sizes.
The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this setting (called the
Maximum Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists, or MAX SMTI for short)
is NP-hard [18, 28]; therefore, the approximability of the MAX SMTI has been intensively
studied.
The MAX SMTI has been studied for various settings (see Table ??). The most general
setting is the two-sided-ties problem (2T), where ties may appear in both men’s and women’s
lists. The second setting is the one-sided-ties problem (1T), where ties can appear only
in women’s lists (i.e., men’s preference lists are strictly ordered and may not include ties).
The third setting is the restricted one-sided-ties problem (R1T), where, in addition to the
second setting, ties can appear only at the end of women’s preference lists. The R1T was
first studied by Irving and Manlove [17], inspired by an actual application for the Scottish
Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [16]. The SFAS is designed to assign residents to
hospitals under the condition that a resident (a man in our marriage case) submits a strictly-
ordered preference list while a hospital (a woman) submits a preference list that may contain
one tie of arbitrary length at the end of the list. In this paper, we also consider another
natural setting, the restricted two-sided ties problem (R2T), which was not studied before.
In R2T, ties can appear in both sexes’ lists, but the position must be the end of the lists.
Let us review previous results on the approximability of the MAX SMTI for 2T, 1T,
and R1T. It is easy to see that any algorithm that produces a stable matching is a 2-
approximation algorithm, but the existence of a (2 − )-approximation algorithm for the
MAX SMTI is nontrivial. For 2T, after several attempts to obtain (2− o(1))-approximation
algorithms [19, 20], a 1.875-approximation algorithm was first presented in [21]. Later,
Király [25] improved it to 1.6667 and McDermid [30] to 1.5, which is the current best
approximation ratio. Recently, Király [26] and Paluch [31] presented simpler linear time
algorithms with the same approximation ratio of 1.5. On the negative side, it is known that
1.1379-approximation is NP-hard and 1.3333-approximation is UG-hard via a reduction from
the vertex cover problem [35]. (Here “UG-hard” means that there is no better approximation
algorithm if the unique games conjecture [24] is true.) Also, an integrality gap for 2T is
shown to be at least 1.5− o(1) [22] for a natural integer programming formulation, which
rules out the possibility of using some current techniques (e.g., rounding and primal-dual
algorithms) to show (1.5− )-approximation.
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Table 2 Upper and lower bounds on approximation ratio and lower bounds on integrality gap
(new results discussed in this paper are in bold)
2T R2T 1T R1T
Upper bounds 1.5 [30] 1.5 [30] 1.4616 [5] 1.4616 [5]
on approximation ratio → 1.25
Lower bounds 1.5− o(1) [22] – 1.3678 [22] –
on integrality gap → 1.3333 → 1.5− o(1) → 1.25
UG lower bounds 1.3333 [35] – 1.25 [13, 35] 1.25 [13, 35]
on approximation ratio → 1.3333
Lower bounds assuming – – – –
MMM-Bi-APM is hard → 1.5
to approximate
It is still open whether there exists a (1.5− )-approximation algorithm for 2T and R2T,
but this problem is resolved for 1T and R1T by providing a 1.4706-approximation algorithm
that uses a linear programming (LP) relaxation [22]. Huang and Kavitha [15] improved
the approximation ratio to 1.4667 by developing a linear time algorithm, and Radnai [32]
tightened the analysis of this algorithm to show 1.4643-approximation. Very recently, Dean
and Jalasutram [5] showed that the algorithm presented in [22] provides the current best
approximation ratio 1.4616 through an analysis using the idea of factor-revealing LP. On
the negative side of 1T and R1T, it is known that 1.1052-approximation is NP-hard and
(1.25− )-approximation is UG-hard, via a reduction from the vertex cover problem [13, 35].
The integrality gap of the natural IP formulation is known to be at least 1.3678 for 1T [22],
but there is no known lower bound on the integrality gap for R1T.
Our contributions
Our contributions (and previous results) are summarized in Table 2.
Our first contribution is to provide a tight upper bound of 1.25 for R1T. This is the first
upper bound result for the MAX SMTI that matches a UG lower bound. Our algorithm
is LP-based, which is almost the same as that in [22], but in this paper we introduce a
novel analysis, which not only avoids the tedious case-analysis used in earlier studies, but
also significantly improves the approximation ratio. In all previous analyses of the current
algorithms, we create a bipartite graph G that is the union of two matchings M∗ and
M , where M∗ is a largest stable matching and M is a stable matching obtained from an
approximation algorithm (see Fig. 1). It is easy to see that the number of short paths
in this graph is directly related to the approximation factor. Indeed, Király [25] showed
that his algorithm does not create length-three paths for 1T, and McDermid [30] did the
same for 2T, both achieving a 1.5 upper bound. The analyses of the algorithms discussed
in [15, 22] bounded the number of length-five paths for 1T, which led to breaking the 1.5
barrier. Unfortunately, natural extension of this approach to longer paths seems to have
a quick limit since there is no obvious way of getting rid of complicated case analysis. In
fact, the current best bound for 1T [5], resulting in an improvement from 1.4643 to 1.4616,
requires a computer-assisted proof to bound the numbers of length-seven and length-nine
paths.
In this paper, we come back to a more direct and standard approach in the analysis
of an LP-based approximation algorithm. That is, we just apply a formula relating the
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Figure 1 Illustrations of (a) a length-three path and (b) a length-five path in the union graph G,
where solid edges represent pairs from M and dashed edges represent pairs from M∗.
LP-relaxed (optimum) value and the optimum integral value. A notable difference between
our new analysis and the old one [22] is that we partition M into three sets of pairs based
on M and M∗ in the old analysis, whereas we do so based on M only in the new analysis.
This difference allows us to avoid handling long paths (such as length-seven and length-nine
paths). One might be curious about an extension of this approach to 1T or even 2T, which
is our obvious future goal.
Our second contribution is to give a 1.3333-UG lower bound for R2T, which is obtained
by modifying the reduction used to show the same UG lower bound for 2T [35]. This result
implies that R2T is strictly harder than R1T under the unique games conjecture, while such
a separation is unknown for 2T and 1T. For R2T, we also show that the integrality gap of
the natural IP formulation is at least 1.3333.
Our third contribution is to show a new lower bound on the integrality gap for 1T.
Specifically, we construct an instance of 1T whose integrality gap is at least 1.5− o(1). This
result suggests that the integrality gap of 1.5 for 2T is no longer a convincing bad sign for
improving the current 1.5 upper bound because we already have a better approximation
ratio for 1T (1.4616) than the integrality gap. Note that our new integrality gap of 1.5− o(1)
does not contradict the upper bounds of less than 1.5 [5, 22] since the technique used in the
algorithms of these studies is not a simple LP rounding.
Our final contribution is to give support to the inapproximability of 2T by relating 2T to
the minimum maximal matching problem (MMM). The MMM is a classical optimization
problem, which asks us to find a maximal matching with minimum cardinality in a given
undirected graph. This problem is known to be NP-hard even for a very restricted class of
graphs (including bipartite graphs) [10, 14, 36]. It is also known that the MMM is equivalent
to the minimum edge dominating set problem (MEDS) with respect to approximability [36],
that is, there exists an α-approximation algorithm for the MMM if and only if there exists
an α-approximation algorithm for the MEDS. So far, the approximability of the MMM (and
equivalently that of the MEDS) has been extensively studied [2, 3, 8, 11, 29], but none
achieved a (2− )-approximation for any constant  > 0 even on bipartite graphs. Regarding
the inapproximability, the current best lower bound under P6=NP is 7/6 for general graphs [4].
Based on the reduction in [18], we show that a (1.5− )-approximation algorithm for 2T for a
constant  > 0 implies a (2− ′)-approximation algorithm for the MMM on bipartite graphs
with an almost-perfect matching (which we call the MMM-Bi-APM) for a constant ′ > 0.
Note that there is no known (2− ′)-approximation algorithm, even for the MMM-Bi-APM.
2 Preliminaries
We now give notations, most of which are taken from [22]. An instance I of the MAX SMTI
is composed of n men, n women, and each person’s preference list that may be incomplete
and may include ties. If a person p includes a person q (of the opposite sex) in p’s preference
list, we say that q is acceptable to p. Without loss of generality, we assume that a man m is
acceptable to w if and only if w is acceptable to m. A matching M is a set of pairs (m,w)
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such that m is acceptable to w and vice versa, and each person appears at most once in M .
If (m,w) ∈M , we say that m (w) is matched in M , and write M(m) = w and M(w) = m.
If p does not appear in M , we say that p is single in M . If m strictly prefers wi to wj , we
write wi m wj . If wi and wj are tied in m’s list (including the case in which wi = wj), we
write wi =m wj . The statement wi m wj is true if and only if wi m wj or wi =m wj . We
use similar notations for women’s preference lists. We say that m and w form a blocking pair
for a matching M (or simply, (m,w) blocks M) if the following three conditions are met:
(i) M(m) 6= w but m and w are acceptable to each other, (ii) w m M(m) or m is single in
M , and (iii) m w M(w) or w is single in M . A matching M is called stable if there is no
blocking pair for M .
The MAX SMTI is the problem of finding the largest stable matching. The following IP
formulation of MAX SMTI instance I, denoted as IP (I), is a generalization of the one for
the original stable marriage problem given in [33, 34]. For each pair (m,w), we introduce a
binary variable xm,w.
Maximize:
∑
i
∑
j
xi,j
Subject to:
∑
i
xi,w ≤ 1 ∀w (1)∑
j
xm,j ≤ 1 ∀m (2)∑
jmw
xm,j +
∑
iwm
xi,w − xm,w ≥ 1 ∀(m,w) ∈ A (3)
xm,w = 0 ∀(m,w) 6∈ A (4)
xm,w ∈ {0, 1} ∀(m,w) (5)
Here, A is the set of mutually acceptable pairs, that is, (m,w) ∈ A if and only if m and w
are acceptable to each other. In this formulation, “xm,w = 1” is interpreted as “m and w
are matched,” and “xm,w = 0” otherwise. Thus the objective function is equal to the size
of a matching. Note that Constraint (3) ensures that (m,w) is not a blocking pair. When
xm,w = 1, all three terms of the left-hand side are 1; hence, Constraint (3) is satisfied. When
xm,w = 0, either the first or the second term of the left-hand side must be 1, which implies
that m (respectively w) must be matched with a partner as good as w (respectively m). The
notation LP (I) denotes the linear program relaxation of IP (I) in which Constraint (5) is
replaced with “0 ≤ xm,w ≤ 1.”
3 Approximation Algorithm for R1T
3.1 Algorithm GSA-LP
We now describe our approximation algorithm GSA-LP for instance I in which the men’s
lists are strict and the women’s lists may contain ties. This algorithm is a simpler version of
the algorithm given in [22], whose pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
we maintain a variable pm (initially set to one), which stores the current position for m in
his preference list, and another priority value fm (initially set to zero) for each m.
The GSA-LP algorithm consists of a sequence of proposals from men to women, as the
standard Gale-Shapley algorithm. When a woman receives proposals from two men, she
keeps the better one and rejects the other. If two men are in the same tie, the woman chooses
APPROX/RANDOM’15
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Algorithm 1 GSA-LP (Gale-Shapley Algorithm with LP solution)
Input: An SMTI instance I
Output: A matching M
1: Formulate the given instance I as an integer program IP (I)
2: Solve its LP relaxation LP (I) and obtain an optimal solution x∗(= {x∗i,j})
3: Let M := ∅
4: Set fm := 0 and pm := 1 for each man m
5: while there exists an m such that (m is single in M) and (fm ≤ 3) do
6: Let m be an arbitrary such man
7: if pm is no larger than the length of m’s preference list then
8: Let w be the pm-th woman of m’s preference list
9: if m has not proposed to w yet then
10: Set fm := fm + x∗m,w and pm := 1
11: else
12: Set pm := pm + 1
13: end if
14: // Let m propose to w
15: if w is single in M then
16: Set M :=M ∪ {(m,w)}
17: else if m w M(w) or (m =w M(w) and fm > fM(w)) then
18: Set M :=M ∪ {(m,w)} \ {(M(w), w)}
19: end if
20: else
21: Set fm := fm + 2 and pm := 1 // m goes to the second round
22: end if
23: end while
24: return M
the man with the larger priority value fm (if two values are the same, she keeps the current
partner).
Intuitively, there are two rounds of proposals for each m. In the first round, whenever m
sends a proposal to w for the first time, the priority value fm is increased by x∗m,w (Lines
9–10). When he is rejected by w (either immediately or later after once accepted), he restarts
his sequence of proposals from the top of his list. Note that in the restarted sequence of
proposals, women he proposes to are not new until w. Up to that woman, fm does not change
and the restart does not happen. If m has proposed to all of the women in his list and he is
still single, then fm increases by 2 and m goes to his second round (Lines 20–21). In the
second round, m sends a sequence of proposals from the top of his list again. Meanwhile, fm
does not change and restart never happens (that is, m sends at most one proposal to each
woman in the second round). It is not hard to see that this algorithm runs in polynomial
time and outputs a stable matching based on a similar argument in [22].
This algorithm is designed so that, if w is eventually matched to m at the termination
of the algorithm, and there is another man m′ who proposed to w at least once and is tied
with m in her preference list (i.e., m =w m′), then we have the following inequality
fm′ =
∑
j′m′w,j′ 6∈S
x∗m′,j′ ≤
∑
jml(m),j 6∈S
x∗m,j = fm, (6)
where l(m) denotes the woman least preferred bym among those who have received a proposal
C.-C., Huang, K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and H. Yanagisawa 367
from m during the algorithm. Here, fm and fm′ refer to the values at the termination of the
algorithm. Also note that, when m proposes to the woman at the end of his list for the first
time, fm ≤ 1. If m is single in M at the termination of the algorithm, he has proposed to all
the women in his list, and fm > 1 holds.
3.2 Analysis of Approximation Ratio
3.2.1 Overview of Analysis
Our analysis is similar to the LP-based analysis used in [22], but the major difference between
these two approaches is that our analysis does not use the bipartite graph on which older
analyses (e.g., [15, 22, 25, 30]) heavily rely. Let us fix an instance I, and let M be the
stable matching output from GSA-LP. We partition M into P , R, and T . Specifically, P
is the set of pairs (m,w) ∈ M such that fm > 1 at the end of the algorithm, T is the set
of pairs (m,w) ∈ M such that fm ≤ 1, w has a tie, and m is contained in her tie, and
R =M \ (P ∪ T ). Let S be the set of men and women who are single in M .
Now we analyze the approximation ratio of GSA-LP under the assumption that ties can
appear only at the end of women’s preference lists. Recall that x∗i,j is the value of xi,j for
the optimum solution x∗ of LP (I). Note that if x∗m,w > 0 for m,w ∈ S, then (m,w) ∈ A by
Constraint (4) of LP (I), so (m,w) is a blocking pair for M . This contradicts the stability of
M ; hence,
∑
i,j∈S x
∗
i,j = 0. Now, let us define the value x∗(X) for a subset X ⊆M as:
x∗(X) =
∑
(m,w)∈X
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w
 .
It is not difficult to see that x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T ) = 2
∑
i
∑
j x
∗
i,j , since
∑
i,j∈S x
∗
i,j = 0.
Note that |M∗| and ∑i∑j x∗i,j are the optimal values for IP (I) and LP (I) respectively,
where M∗ is an optimal solution of I (that is, one of the maximum stable matchings of I).
Hence we have that |M∗| ≤∑i∑j x∗i,j = (x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T ))/2. We later prove the
following key lemma.
I Lemma 1. x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T ) ≤ 52 (|P |+ |R|+ |T |).
From this, we have that |M∗| ≤ (x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T ))/2 ≤ 54 (|P |+ |R|+ |T |) = 54 |M |,
and Theorem 2 follows:
I Theorem 2. The approximation ratio of GSA-LP is at most 5/4 for R1T.
Remarks on Integrality Gap
The proof of Theorem 2 implies∑
i
∑
j
x∗i,j ≤
5
4 |M | ≤
5
4 |M
∗|,
and this means that the integrality gap of IP (I) is at most 5/4. This result is tight because
the integrality gap of IP (I) is at least 5/4, which is shown in Threorem 17.
3.2.2 Proof Sketch of Lemma 1
For readability, we first give a simpler proof of Lemma 1 for a special case in which two
conditions (which we explain shortly) hold. The full proof (without conditions) is included
in Sec. 3.2.3. We first define the following symbols (see also Fig. 2).
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mp : · · ·wp · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
mr : · · ·︸︷︷︸
ρ
wr · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ
mt : · · ·wt · · · l(mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ
· · ·︸︷︷︸
τ
wp : · · ·mp · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
wr : · · ·mr︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
· · ·︸︷︷︸
r
wt : · · · · · · (· · ·mt · · · )︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
Figure 2 Illustrations of symbols pi, ρ, ρ, τ , τ , p, r, r, and t for pairs (mp, wp) ∈ P , (mr, wr) ∈ R,
and (mt, wt) ∈ T .
pi = {(m, j) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ P, j 6∈ S},
p = {(i, w) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ P, i 6∈ S},
ρ = {(m, j) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ R, j m w, j 6∈ S},
ρ = {(m, j) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ R,w m j, j 6∈ S},
r = {(i, w) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ R, i w m, i 6∈ S},
r = {(i, w) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ R,m w i, i 6∈ S},
τ = {(m, j) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ T, j m l(m), j 6∈ S},
τ = {(m, j) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ T, l(m) m j, j 6∈ S}, and
t = {(i, w) ∈ A | (m,w) ∈ T, i 6∈ S}.
For X ∈ {pi, ρ, ρ, τ, τ , p, r, r, t}, Y ∈ {pi, ρ, ρ, τ, τ}, and Z ∈ {p, r, r, t}, we define σ(X) and
σ(Y,Z) as
σ(X) =
∑
(m,w)∈X
x∗m,w and σ(Y,Z) =
∑
(m,w)∈Y ∩Z
x∗m,w.
The two conditions we use in this section are (I) P = ∅ and (II) σ(ρ)/|R| ≤ σ(τ)/|T |.
Condition (II) is introduced to avoid using Inequality (6) in the analysis, which can make
the proof significantly simpler. Inequality (6) implies that we have fm′ ≤ fm for any
(m,w) ∈ T and (m′, w′) ∈ R such that both m and m′ have proposed to w during the course
of GSA-LP. The intuitive meaning of Condition (II) is that fm′ ≤ fm holds on average if
we choose (m,w) ∈ T and (m′, w′) ∈ R uniformly at random. Note that fm ≈ σ(τ)/|T | and
fm′ ≈ σ(ρ)/|R| for m and m′ selected in this manner. Note also that Condition (II) does
not hold in general because, in its interpretation, we do not guarantee that m′ proposes to w
(which is the case for Inequality (6)).
First, we prove several useful lemmas. Note that the claims similar to these lemmas are
already proven in [22]. Lemma 3 is immediate from the definition since σ(pi) = σ(p) = 0 from
Condition (I). Lemma 4 also holds under Condition (I), but Lemmas 5–7 hold without any
condition. Among these lemmas, Lemma 7 plays a key role in the analysis for R1T because
it uses the restriction that each woman can contain a tie at the end of her preference list.
I Lemma 3. (Under Condition (I)) σ(ρ) + σ(ρ) + σ(τ) + σ(τ) = σ(r) + σ(r) + σ(t).
I Lemma 4. (Under Condition (I)) σ(r) = σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ , r).
Proof. By definition and Condition (I), we have σ(r) = σ(ρ, r) + σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ, r) + σ(τ , r).
To prove this lemma, we show that σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ, r) = 0. If this does not hold, then there
is a pair (i, j) ∈ (ρ ∪ τ) ∩ r. Such (i, j) satisfies M(j) 6= i by the definitions of ρ, τ , and r.
Also, i =j M(j) holds because (i, j) ∈ r means that i j M(j) and (i, j) ∈ ρ ∪ τ means that
i must have proposed to j and woman j rejected the proposal, which implies M(j) j i.
However, (M(j), j) ∈ R means that M(j) is not included in j’s tie; a contradiction. J
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I Lemma 5. For any (m,w) ∈M ,∑
jmw,j∈S
x∗m,j = 0 and
∑
iwm,i∈S
x∗i,w = 0.
Proof. For the left equation, suppose that there is a woman j such that j ∈ S and j m w.
Then j must include m in her list. Hence, (m, j) blocks M , which contradicts the stability
of M . Therefore, no such j exists; hence,
∑
jmw,j∈S x
∗
m,j actually sums up an empty set of
variables. The right equation can also be validated in a similar way. J
I Lemma 6. σ(ρ) + σ(r) ≥ |R|.
Proof. For each (m,w) ∈ R, we have∑
jmw,j 6∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
iwm,i 6∈S
x∗i,w =
∑
jmw
x∗m,j +
∑
iwm
x∗i,w ≥ 1.
The equality comes from Lemma 5 and the fact that m is not in a tie of w’s list because
(m,w) ∈ R. The inequality comes from Constraint (3) of LP formulation. By adding this
inequality for all (m,w) ∈ R, we have σ(ρ) + σ(r) ≥ |R|. J
I Lemma 7. For any (m,w) ∈ T , ∑
i∈S
x∗i,w = 0.
Proof. Since (m,w) ∈ T , there is no man i such that m w i because m is included in w’s
tie, which is located at the end of the list. If i ∈ S and i w m, then x∗i,w = 0 by Lemma 5.
We show that there is no i such that i ∈ S and i =w m. Suppose on the contrary that i(∈ S)
and m are tied in w’s list. Since i is single in M , i must have proposed to w with fi > 1.
By the definition of T , fm ≤ 1 when m proposed to w. Therefore, it is impossible that m,
rather than i, is matched with w in M ; a contradiction. This completes the proof. J
Now we are ready to give the proof of Lemma 1. Recall that P = ∅ by Condition (I);
hence, x∗(P ) = 0. Our goal here is x∗(R)+x∗(T ) ≤ 52 (|R|+ |T |). If σ(ρ) > |R||T |/(|R|+ |T |),
then we have
x∗(R) + x∗(T ) =
∑
(m,w)∈R
2∑
j
x∗m,j + 2
∑
i
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j −
∑
i6∈S
x∗i,w

+
∑
(m,w)∈T
2∑
j
x∗m,j + 2
∑
i
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j −
∑
i6∈S
x∗i,w

≤ 4|R|+ 4|T | − σ(ρ)− σ(ρ)− σ(τ)− σ(τ)− σ(r)− σ(r)− σ(t)
= 4|R|+ 4|T | − 2σ(ρ)− 2σ(ρ)− 2σ(τ)− 2σ(τ) (by Lemma 3)
≤ 4|R|+ 4|T | − 2σ(ρ)− 2σ(ρ, r)− 2σ(τ)− 2σ(τ , r)
= 4|R|+ 4|T | − 2σ(ρ)− 2σ(τ)− 2σ(r) (by Lemma 4)
≤ 2|R|+ 4|T | − 2σ(τ) (by Lemma 6)
≤ 2|R|+ 4|T | − 2 |T ||R|σ(ρ) (by Condition (II))
< 2|R|+ 4|T | − 2|T |
2
|R|+ |T | (since σ(ρ) > |R||T|/(|R|+|T|))
≤ 52(|R|+ |T |).
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Otherwise (i.e., σ(ρ) ≤ |R||T |/(|R|+ |T |)), then we have
x∗(R) + x∗(T ) =
∑
(m,w)∈R
2∑
j
x∗m,j + 2
∑
i
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j −
∑
i 6∈S
x∗i,w

+
∑
(m,w)∈T
2∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i6∈S
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j
 (by Lemma 7)
≤ 4|R| − σ(ρ)− σ(ρ)− σ(r)− σ(r) + 2|T |+ σ(t)− σ(τ)− σ(τ)
= 4|R|+ 2|T | − 2σ(r)− 2σ(r) (by Lemma 3)
≤ 4|R|+ 2|T | − 2(|R| − σ(ρ)) (by Lemma 6)
≤ 2|R|+ 2|T |+ 2|R||T ||R|+ |T | (since σ(ρ) ≤ |R||T|/(|R|+|T|))
≤ 52(|R|+ |T |).
J
3.2.3 Full Proof of Lemma 1
In this section, we give a full proof of Lemma 1 (without Conditions (I) and (II)). Recall
that in Sec. 3.2.2, we defined nine symbols such as pi and p. For the full proof, we need three
more symbols: For each (m,w) ∈ T , let
τm = {(m, j) ∈ A | j m l(m), j 6∈ S},
τm = {(m, j) ∈ A | l(m) m j, j 6∈ S}, and
tw = {(i, w) ∈ A | i 6∈ S}.
The following Lemmas 8–10 are unconditional counterparts of Lemmas 3 and 4 in
Sec. 3.2.2.
I Lemma 8. (i) For any w, σ(tw) = σ(pi, tw) + σ(ρ, tw) + σ(ρ, tw) + σ(τ, tw) + σ(τ , tw) and
(ii) σ(t) = σ(pi, t) + σ(ρ, t) + σ(ρ, t) + σ(τ, t) + σ(τ , t).
Proof. By definition, tw = (pi ∩ tw) ∪ (ρ ∩ tw) ∪ (ρ ∩ tw) ∪ (τ ∩ tw) ∪ (τ , tw), and the five
intersections in the right-hand side are mutually disjoint. This proves (i). (ii) can be proved
similarly. J
I Lemma 9. (i) σ(r) ≥ σ(pi, r)+σ(ρ, r)+σ(τ, r). (ii) σ(ρ) ≥ σ(ρ, r)+σ(ρ, t). (iii) σ(τm) ≥
σ(τm, r). (iv) σ(p) ≥ σ(pi, p) + σ(ρ, p) + σ(τ, p). (v) σ(τm) ≥ σ(τm, t). (vi) σ(τm) ≥
σ(τm, r) + σ(τm, t).
Proof. (i) By definition, σ(r) = σ(pi, r) + σ(ρ, r) + σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ, r) + σ(τ , r) ≥ σ(pi, r) +
σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ, r). (ii)–(vi) can be proved similarly. J
I Lemma 10. (i) σ(ρ) = σ(ρ, p) + σ(ρ, r) + σ(ρ, t). (ii) σ(pi) = σ(pi, p) + σ(pi, r) + σ(pi, t).
(iii) σ(τ) = σ(τ, p) + σ(τ, r) + σ(τ, t). (iv) σ(r) = σ(ρ, r) + σ(τ , r).
Proof. (i) By definition, σ(ρ) = σ(ρ, p)+σ(ρ, r)+σ(ρ, r)+σ(ρ, t). Now we show σ(ρ, r) = 0.
If this does not hold, then there is a pair (i, j) ∈ ρ∩r. Pair (i, j) ∈ ρ implies that (i,M(i)) ∈ R
and j i M(i), and (i, j) ∈ r implies that (M(j), j) ∈ R and i j M(j). Since (M(j), j) ∈ R,
i and M(j) are not tied in j’s preference list; hence, i j M(j). Since j i M(i), i proposed
to j during the algorithm. Hence, j must be matched with i or more a preferable man, which
contradicts i j M(j). Therefore, no such (i, j) exists and σ(ρ, r) = 0.
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(ii) By definition, σ(pi) = σ(pi, p)+σ(pi, r)+σ(pi, r)+σ(pi, t). We show that σ(pi, r) = 0. If
not, there are a man i and a woman j such that (i,M(i)) ∈ P , (M(j), j) ∈ R, and i j M(j).
It is impossible that i =j M(j) because i 6=M(j) since (i,M(i)) ∈ P and (M(j), j) ∈ R, and
i and M(j) are not tied in j’s preference list by the definition of R. Therefore i j M(j).
Also, by the definition of P , fi > 1 at the end of the algorithm; hence, i must have proposed
to all of the women in his list, especially, to j. Using a similar argument to the proof of part
(i), we have a contradiction, implying that σ(pi, r) = 0.
(iii) By definition, σ(τ) = σ(τ, p) + σ(τ, r) + σ(τ, r) + σ(τ, t). By noting that m proposes
to all the women from the top of the list to l(m), we can show that σ(τ, r) = 0 using a similar
argument as the proofs of parts (i) and (ii).
(iv) By definition, σ(r) = σ(pi, r)+σ(ρ, r)+σ(ρ, r)+σ(τ, r)+σ(τ , r). We already proved
that σ(pi, r) = 0, σ(ρ, r) = 0, and σ(τ, r) = 0. J
The following Lemma 11 is an elaborate version of Lemma 7.
I Lemma 11. (i) For any (m,w) ∈ P ,∑j∈S x∗m,j = 0. (ii) For any (m,w) ∈ T ,∑i∈S x∗i,w =
0.
Proof. (i) (m,w) ∈ P implies that m has proposed to all the women in his list; hence, they
are matched in M . Therefore, there is no (m, j) such that (m,w) ∈ P and j ∈ S.
(ii) Since (m,w) ∈ T , there is no man i such that m w i because w includes m in her
tie at the end of her preference list. If i ∈ S and i w m, then x∗i,w = 0 by Lemma 5. We
show that there is no i such that i ∈ S and i =w m. Suppose on the contrary that i(∈ S)
and m are tied in w’s list. Since i is single in M , i must have proposed to w with fi > 1.
By the definition of T , fm ≤ 1 when m proposed to w. Therefore, it is impossible that m,
rather than i, is matched with w in M ; a contradiction. This completes the proof. J
In the subsequent three lemmas, we bound x∗(P ), x∗(R), and x∗(T ), which will lead to
the proof of Lemma 15.
I Lemma 12. x∗(P ) ≤ 2|P |+ σ(pi, r) + σ(pi, t)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p).
Proof. We have
x∗(P ) =
∑
(m,w)∈P
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w

=
∑
(m,w)∈P
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j + 2
∑
i
x∗i,w −
∑
i 6∈S
x∗i,w

≤ σ(pi) + 2|P | − σ(p)
≤ σ(pi) + 2|P | − σ(pi, p)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p)
= 2|P |+ σ(pi, r) + σ(pi, t)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p).
The first equality is the definition of x∗(P ), and the second equality is from Lemma 11(i). The
first inequality is from the definitions of σ(pi) and σ(p), and the fact that
∑
(m,w)∈P
∑
i x
∗
i,w ≤
|P | by Constraint (1) of LP formulation. The second inequality is from Lemma 9(iv). The
last equality is from Lemma 10(ii). J
I Lemma 13. x∗(R) ≤ 2|R|+ σ(ρ)− σ(ρ, t) + σ(τ , r)− σ(r).
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Proof. We have
x∗(R) =
∑
(m,w)∈R
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w

=
∑
(m,w)∈R
2∑
j
x∗m,j + 2
∑
i
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j −
∑
i 6∈S
x∗i,w

≤ 2|R|+ 2|R| − (σ(ρ) + σ(ρ))− (σ(r) + σ(r))
≤ 2|R|+ σ(ρ)− σ(ρ, r)− σ(ρ, t) + σ(r)− σ(r)
= 2|R|+ σ(ρ)− σ(ρ, t) + σ(τ , r)− σ(r).
The first equality is the definition of x∗(R). The first inequality is from Constraints (1) and
(2) of LP formulation and definitions of σ(ρ), σ(ρ), σ(r), and σ(r). The last inequality is
from Lemmas 9(ii) and 6. The last equality is from Lemma 10(iv). J
I Lemma 14.
x∗(T ) ≤ 2|T | − σ(τ , r)− σ(t) +
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}.
Proof. By definition,
x∗(T ) =
∑
(m,w)∈T
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w
 .
We will bound the quantity inside the parentheses in two ways. First, for each (m,w) ∈ T ,
we have∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w
≤ 1 + 1 + (1− σ(τm)− σ(τm)) + (1− σ(tw))
≤ 4− (σ(τm) + σ(τm, r))− σ(tw). (7)
The first inequality is from Constraints (1) and (2) of LP formulation and definitions of
σ(τm), σ(τm), and σ(tw). The last inequality is from Lemma 9(iii).
Next, for each (m,w) ∈ T , we have
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w
= 2
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i 6∈S
x∗i,w −
∑
j 6∈S
x∗m,j
≤ 2 + σ(tw)− (σ(τm) + σ(τm))
≤ 2 + σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, r) + σ(τm, t)). (8)
The equality comes from Lemma 11(ii) and the last inequality is from (v) and (vi) of Lemma 9.
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Combining Inequalities (7) and (8), we have
x∗(T ) =
∑
(m,w)∈T
∑
j
x∗m,j +
∑
i
x∗i,w +
∑
j∈S
x∗m,j +
∑
i∈S
x∗i,w

≤
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{4− (σ(τm) + σ(τm, r))− σ(tw),
2 + σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, r) + σ(τm, t))}
= 2|T | − σ(τ , r)− σ(t)
+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}.
J
To simplify notation, let δm,w = 2(σ(τ, tw) + σ(τ , tw) − σ(τm, t) − σ(τm, t)) for each
(m,w) ∈ T .
I Lemma 15. x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T ) ≤
2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− 2σ(τm), 2σ(pi, tw) + 2σ(ρ, tw) + δm,w}.
Proof. Starting from Lemmas 12, 13, and 14, we have the sequence of deformations of the
formula. To help following the deformations, we give underlines to the terms that are used
for the deformation.
x∗(P ) + x∗(R) + x∗(T )
≤ 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |+ (σ(pi, r) + σ(pi, t)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p))
+(σ(ρ)− σ(ρ, t)+σ(τ , r)− σ(r))
−σ(τ , r)− σ(t) +
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}
= 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |+ (σ(pi, r) + σ(pi, t)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p))
+(σ(ρ)−σ(ρ, t)− σ(r))
−σ(t) +
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}
≤ 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |+ (σ(pi, r)+σ(pi, t)− σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p)) + (σ(ρ)−σ(r))
−σ(t) +
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(ρ, tw) + σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}
(Use Lemmas 8(ii) and 9(i).)
≤ 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T | − σ(ρ, p)− σ(τ, p) + (σ(ρ)−σ(ρ, r)− σ(τ, r))
−σ(ρ, t)−σ(ρ, t)− σ(τ , t)− σ(τ, t)
+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(ρ, tw) + σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}
(Use Lemma 10(i).)
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= 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |−σ(τ, p)− σ(τ, r)− σ(ρ, t)− σ(τ , t)− σ(τ, t)
+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (σ(ρ, tw) + σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))}
(Use Lemma 10(iii).)
≤ 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |
+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− 2σ(τm), 2σ(tw)− (2σ(ρ, tw) + 2σ(τm, t) + 2σ(τm, t))}
(Use Lemma 8(i).)
= 2|P |+ 2|R|+ 2|T |+
∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− 2σ(τm),
2σ(pi, tw) + 2σ(ρ, tw) + 2(σ(τ, tw) + σ(τ , tw)− σ(τm, t)− σ(τm, t))}.
For the last inequality, we also used the inequality min{a, b} − c ≤ min{a− x, b− y}, where
x ≤ c and y ≤ c. J
I Lemma 16.∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− 2σ(τm), 2σ(pi, tw) + 2σ(ρ, tw) + δm,w} ≤ 12(|P |+ |R|+ |T |).
Proof. For each pair (m,w) ∈ T , let P (w) = {i | (i,M(i)) ∈ P, i =w m}, R(w) = {i |
(i,M(i)) ∈ R, i =w m,w i M(i)}, and PR(w) = P (w) ∪ R(w). Then it is not difficult to
see that
σ(pi, tw) + σ(ρ, tw) =
∑
(i,M(i))∈P
x∗i,w +
∑
(i,M(i))∈R,wiM(i)
x∗i,w
=
∑
(i,M(i))∈P,i=wm
x∗i,w +
∑
(i,M(i))∈R,wiM(i),i=wm
x∗i,w
=
∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w. (9)
The first equality is from the definitions of σ(pi, tw) and σ(ρ, tw) for (m,w) ∈ T . For the
second equality, first note that there is no man i such that m w i because (m,w) ∈ T . Also,
note that any i considered in the summation has proposed to w during the execution of the
algorithm; hence, there is no i such that i w m and x∗i,w > 0. Therefore, considering only i
such that i =w m suffices. The last equality is from the definition of PR(w).
For w such that (m,w) ∈ T and a man i ∈ PR(w), we define pii = {(i, j) ∈ A} if i ∈ P (w),
ρi = {(i, j) ∈ A | j i M(i)} if i ∈ R(w), and piρi = pii ∪ ρi for i ∈ PR(w). Then, define
νi,w = x∗i,w/σ(piρi) and
νw =
∑
i∈PR(w)
νi,w.
Now, for each (m,w) ∈ T , we have
σ(τm) =
∑
jml(m)
x∗m,j ≥ max
i∈PR(w)
σ(pi, ρi) ≥
∑
i∈PR(w)
νi,w
νw
σ(pi, ρi) =
1
νw
∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w. (10)
The first equality is due to the definition of τm and the fact that m has proposed to any
woman j such that j m l(m). For the first inequality, we used Inequality (6). More
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specifically, we used the fact that each man i ∈ PR(w) must have proposed to w with the
f -value of at least
σ(pi, ρi) =
∑
(i,j)∈piρi
x∗i,j ,
but m, who proposed to w with the f -value∑
jml(m)
x∗m,j ,
is eventually matched to w. For the second inequality, we used the fact that a (weighted)
average of σ(pi, ρi) over i ∈ PR(w) is no more than the maximum over i ∈ PR(w).
For (m,w) ∈ T such that ∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w ≤
νw
2(1 + νw)
(2− δm,w),
we have
2σ(pi, tw)+2σ(ρ, tw)+ δm,w = 2
∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w+ δm,w ≤
2νw + δm,w
1 + νw
≤ 1 + νw2 + δm,w. (11)
The first equality comes from Equation (9). For the last inequality, we used δm,w1+νw ≤ δm,w,
and the fact that 2x/(1 + x) ≤ (1 + x)/2 holds for any x ≥ 0.
For (m,w) ∈ T such that ∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w ≥
νw
2(1 + νw)
(2− δm,w),
we have, from Inequality (10)
2− 2σ(τm) ≤ 2− 2
νw
∑
i∈PR(w)
x∗i,w ≤ 2−
2− δm,w
1 + νw
= 2νw + δm,w1 + νw
≤ 1 + νw2 + δm,w. (12)
Therefore, we have∑
(m,w)∈T
min{2− 2σ(τm), 2σ(pi, tw) + 2σ(ρ, tw) + δm,w}
≤
∑
(m,w)∈T
(
1 + νw
2 + δm,w
)
=
∑
(m,w)∈T
1 + νw
2 + 2
∑
(m,w)∈T
(σ(τ, tw) + σ(τ , tw)− σ(τm, t)− σ(τm, t))
=
∑
(m,w)∈T
1 + νw
2
= 12
∑
(m,w)∈T
1 + ∑
i∈PR(w)
νi,w

= |T |2 +
1
2
∑
(i,M(i))∈P∪R
∑
(m,w)∈T
νi,w
≤ |P |+ |R|+ |T |2 .
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The first inequality comes from Inequalities (11) and (12). For the second equality, note that∑
(m,w)∈T
(σ(τ, tw) + σ(τ , tw)) = σ(τ, t) + σ(τ , t) =
∑
(m,w)∈T
(σ(τm, t) + σ(τm, t))
by the definitions of σ(τ, tw), σ(τ , tw), σ(τm, t), and σ(τm, t). For the last equality, we
exchanged the order of summation. The last inequality is due to the fact that for each
(i,M(i)) ∈ P ∪R, ∑
(m,w)∈T
νi,w ≤ 1.
J
Combining Lemmas 15 and 16, we can easily obtain Lemma 1. J
4 Lower Bounds
In this section, we show several results related to the inapproximability of the MAX SMTI.
We first show three lower bounds on the integrality gap of the IP formulation given in Sec. 2,
though the proof of Theorem 18 is omitted due to limitations of space.
I Theorem 17. The integrality gap of the IP formulation given in Sec. 2 is at least 1.25 for
R1T.
Proof. We show an R1T instance I1 whose integrality gap is (at least) 1.25.
m1: w1 w1: m2 m3 m1
m2: w2 w1 w2: (m2 m3)
m3: w2 w1 w3 w3: m3
One of the largest stable matchings for I1 is M∗ = {(m2, w1), (m3, w2)}. There is a feasible
fractional solution x for LP (I1) such that xm1,w1 = xm2,w1 = xm2,w2 = xm3,w2 = xm3,w3 =
0.5. Hence, the integrality gap is at least (5× 0.5)/|M∗| = 1.25. J
I Theorem 18. The integrality gap of the IP formulation given in Sec. 2 is at least 1.3333
for R2T.
I Theorem 19. The integrality gap of the IP formulation given in Sec. 2 is at least 1.5−o(1)
for 1T.
Proof. We show a 1T instance I3 whose integrality gap is 1.5− o(1).
m1: w1 w′1 w1: (m1 m2 m3 · · · mk) m′1
m2: w1 w2 w′2 w2: (m2 m3 · · · mk) m′1
m3: w1 w2 w3 w′3 w3: (m3 · · · mk) m′3
...
mk−1: w1 w2 w3 · · · wk−1 w′k−1 wk−1: (mk−1 mk) m′k−1
mk: w1 w2 w3 · · · wk−1 wk w′k wk: mk m′k
m′1: w1 w′1: m1
...
m′k: wk w′k: mk
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The largest stable matchingM∗ for this instance is {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (mk, wk)}. There
is a feasible fractional solution x for LP (I3) such that xmi,wj = 1/k, xmi,w′i = 1− i/k, and
xm′
j
,wj = (j − 1)/k for all of the pairs (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}2. Hence, the integrality gap is at
least
LP (I3)/|M∗| =
k + k∑
j=1
j − 1
k
 /k = 3/2− o(1).
J
The lower bound of Theorem 19 is an improvement over the previous bound of 1.3678 [22].
This result rules out some current techniques to obtain an approximation algorithm with a
factor of 1.5−  for 1T.
Second, we show a relation between the general 2T case of the MAX SMTI and a
special case of the minimum maximal matching problem (MMM-Bi-APM()) with respect to
inapproximability, which is formally written as Theorem 21.
I Definition 20. The MMM-Bi-APM() (for given  such that 0 <  < 1/2) is the problem
to find a minimum maximal matching on a given balanced bipartite graph G = (U, V,E)
(|U | = |V |) that contains a matching M of size at least (1− )|U | (= (1− )|V |).
I Theorem 21. If the MMM-Bi-APM() is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of
2− , then the MAX SMTI with two-sided ties (2T) is NP-hard to approximate to within a
factor of 3/2−O().
Proof. We show that, if there is an approximation algorithm with approximation ratio
α = 3/(2 + + 2(1− )) = 3/2−O() for the MAX SMTI with two-sided ties (2T), then
there is a (2− )-approximation algorithm for the MMM-Bi-APM().
To show this, let G = (U, V,E) such that |U | = |V | = n be a balanced bipartite graph, an
input of the MMM-Bi-APM(). Let U = {u1, . . . , un} and V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We construct
an instance IG of MAX SMTI as follows. Let k = b(1 + )n/2c. IG consists of n+ k men
ui(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and xi(1 ≤ i ≤ k), and n+ k women vi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and wi(1 ≤ i ≤ k). Each
man ui corresponds to a vertex ui of U , and each woman vi corresponds to a vertex vi of
V . Hereafter, we do not distinguish between the names of these persons and vertices. The
preference lists are given in the following. For a vertex v ∈ U ∪ V , N(v) denotes the set of
vertices incident to v, and [N(v)] denotes an arbitrary ordering of vertices in N(v).
u1: ([N(u1)]) w1 · · · wk v1: ([N(v1)]) x1 · · · xk
...
...
...
...
un: ([N(un)]) w1 · · · wk vn: ([N(vn)]) x1 · · · xk
x1: v1 · · · vn w1: u1 · · · un
...
...
...
...
xk: v1 · · · vn wk: u1 · · · un
LetM∗ be a minimum maximal matching of G = (U, V,E). Then |M∗| ≥ (1−)n/2 by the
assumption that G contains a matching of size at least (1−)n. Next, it is easy to see that the
above MAX SMTI instance IG has a stable matching of size |M∗|+(2n−2|M∗|) = 2n−|M∗|.
(If (ui, vj) ∈ M∗ then include the pair (ui, vj). If ui is unmatched in M∗, then include
(ui, wi′) for some i′, and similarly if vj is unmatched in M∗, include (xj′ , vj) for some
j′.) Therefore, if we have an α-approximation algorithm for the MAX SMTI, then this
algorithm produces a matching M of size at least (2n − |M∗|)/α. Let T be the set of
pairs in M between people in U and V . First, it is easy to see that T is a maximal
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matching of G since if G is not maximal then M contains a blocking pair. Next, note
that the size of M is exactly 2n − |T |, which implies that 2n − |T | ≥ (2n − |M∗|)/α.
Hence we have |T |/|M∗| ≤ 2(1 − 1/α)n/|M∗| + 1/α ≤ 4(1 − 1/α)/(1 − ) + 1/α, where
we use |M∗| ≥ (1 − )n/2 for the last inequality. Therefore, if there is an algorithm with
approximation ratio α = 3/(2 + + 2(1− )) for the MAX SMTI, then T is an approximate
solution for the MMM-Bi-APM() with an approximation ratio at most
|T |/|M∗| ≤ 4(1− 1/α)/(1− ) + 1/α
= 4(1− (2 + + 2(1− ))/3)/(1− ) + (2 + + 2(1− ))/3
= 43 −
8
3+
1
3(2 + + 2(1− ))
= 2− 53−
2
3
2
< 2− .
J
The (in)approximability of the MMM-Bi-APM() is unknown, but we informally discuss
it. It would be easy to construct a (2 − )-approximation algorithm for the MMM-Bi-
APM() if we had an approximation algorithm with a constant approximation ratio for
the maximum balanced independent set problem on bipartite graphs, which asks us to find
a largest independent set U ′ ∪ V ′ such that U ′ ⊆ U , V ′ ⊆ V , and |U ′| = |V ′| in a given
bipartite graph G = (U, V,E). However, this problem is known to be NP-hard and is hard
to approximate (does not allow any constant approximation algorithm) under plausible
assumptions [1, 6, 7, 23]. Although these results do not immediately rule out the existence
of the (2− )-approximation algorithm for the MMM-Bi-APM(), they imply some difficulty
of this problem.
Finally, we also show another inapproximability result for R2T, which is formally written
as Theorem 22. This result can be obtained by slightly modifying the inapproximability
proof for 2T given in [35].
I Theorem 22. The MAX SMTI problem in which each person is allowed to include a tie
only at the end of the preference list (R2T) is NP-hard to approximate with any factor smaller
than 33/29 and is UG-hard to approximate with any factor smaller than 4/3.
Proof. Yanagisawa [35] used a reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem with a
perfect matching (which is UG hard to (2 − )-approximate) to the 2T problem. In the
reduction, he used the following gadget for each edge in a perfect matching.
vAj : vbj vai : vBi
vBi : (ecij vbj) vbi1 · · · vbidi vai vbj : eCij vBi vBj1 · · · vBjdj vAj
eCij : ecij (vbi vbj) ecij : (vBj vBi ) eCij
vBj : (ecij vbi ) vbj1 · · · vbjdj vaj vbi : eCij vBj vBi1 · · · vBidi vAi
vAi : vbi vaj : vBj
By modifying this gadget to the following one, we can satisfy the restriction that all the ties
appear at the end of preference lists.
vAj : vbj vai : vBi
vBi : ecij vbj vbi1 · · · vbidi vai vbj : eCij vBi vBj1 · · · vBjdj vAj
eCij : ecij (vbi vbj) ecij : (vBj vBi eCij)
vBj : ecij vbi vbj1 · · · vbjdj vaj vbi : eCij vBj vBi1 · · · vBidi vAi
vAi : vbi vaj : vBj
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It is easy to see that a matching M is stable for a MAX SMTI instance obtained from the
original gadget if and only if M is stable for the MAX SMTI instance obtained from the
modified gadget. Hence, the inapproximability result for 2T carries over to R2T. J
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